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FROM THE
DESK OF THE COMMISH |
May 13, 2000
Dispelling the Myths of Baseball
If you listen to sports talk radio, television announcers, baseball pundits,
writers, newspaper columnists, Bob Costas or Phoenix Predator GM's, you know that there
are two big "problems" with the great game of baseball today: a) the number of
runs being scored and home runs being hit, and b) the revenue disparity between
"big-market" and "small-market" teams. If you believe the media - or
those who allow the media to stick their hands in their backs and control the little
levers that move their mouths up and down - these problems are destroying the game we all
know and love and will eventually cause the game to collapse upon itself, triggering the
apocalypse.
Because I like to be a contrarian when it comes to issues involving baseball, the media
and the apocalypse, I'd like to take a few minutes out of my busy schedule to examine
these pressing issues. So if you would, please unfold your arms, stop shaking your head
back and forth and open your mind just a little.
First, let's look at the "Great Longball Controversy of 2000." This is really
nothing, as the rate of homers has been rising steadily for years. Instead of a slow,
steady progression, though, we've witnessed huge jumps in offense in 1986, 1994 and 1998.
Each time, the bar is raised a little higher and each time baseball fans become a little
more worried. Baseball fans - REAL baseball fans who can recite the Infield Fly Rule and
can name the starting lineup of the 1978 Yankees off the tops of their heads - have become
woozy with all the runs crossing the plate these days. It is disturbing to most of us to
see the game change in such a drastic way, seemingly overnight. Yet if you read all the
polls and look at all the attendance figures and merchandise sales, none of this seems to
bother most so-called baseball fans.
The real question is: is there a problem?
So what if runs are being scored more often than Don Zimmer passes gas? So what if the
home run has become as commonplace as body hair on Paul Marazita's bar of shower soap? Why
has this onslaught against major league pitching become such a problem that it must be
solved? In no particular order, here are the most popular reasons I've heard:
1. "The numbers being put up by today's hitters are distorting age-old
definitions of excellence and are making it nearly impossible to compare players of today
against players of yesterday." This is certainly true, even when comparing
players of today against players of ten years ago. 30 homers and 100 RBI's used to be
enough to win a player a nice shiny trophy. Last season, 38 players - more than one per
team - accomplished this "feat." But just as you can't compare ballplayers from
today against ballplayers of ten years ago without making adjustments for era, the same is
true when comparing players of ANY two different eras. All the time-honored standards of
excellence we all hold dear - .300 average, 30 home runs, 40 homers, 50 homers, 60 homers,
100 RBI's, 500 career homers, 300 wins, etc. - are meaningless without putting them into
proper perspective. 300 wins for a pitcher who threw 60 games (and completed 55 of them)
in the 1900's isn't the same as a pitcher who won 300 games in the 70's, 80's or 90's. A
.300 average in 1968 is not the same as a .300 average in 1930. Comparing stats between
eras has always involved adjustments (or should have), and that hasn't changed. I've said
it before and I'll say it again: baseball, like everything else in the world, is cyclical.
2. "The home run has become boring." If this is true, why do
people still show up early to watch Mark McGwire take batting practice? Why do so many
people stand and cheer when someone on the home team hits one over the wall? After
witnessing yet another ball fly out of the park this summer, find yourself a ten-year-old
kid and ask him how boring that was. Commonplace, yes. Boring, never.
3. "Home runs have taken over the game." Sorry to say, but
that's been the case for years - even before the homer explosion of the late '90's. Who
gets more commercial endorsements: Mark McGwire or Greg Maddux? Who gets a bigger paycheck
each month: Carlos Delgado or John Olerud? Who will get more Hall of Fame consideration:
Sammy Sosa or Tim Raines? Who is more famous: Babe Ruth or Christy Mathewson? Since The
Babe first stepped to the plate, people have always been fascinated with the home run more
than any other feat in baseball. Those of us who love the game for its subtle nuances and
strategies are in the minority. The more popular the game is, the better it is for all
baseball fans. More games to watch on television, more magazines and web sites devoted to
the game, more time devoted to the game on talk radio. Like it or not, our enjoyment of
the game as baseball purists depends on the enjoyment of the game by baseball novices.
In the end, does it really hurt the game if every team's number nine-hitting backup
shortstop clubs 20 homers a year? Isn't a 16-14 game every bit as exciting as a 3-1 game?
Doesn't the better team still win in either scenario?
Unfortunately, this is where my contrarian position breaks down, as my answers to these
questions are: yes, no and no. But I have my own reason for why this has become a problem,
and it has nothing to do with tainting old records. My reason is simply that baseball is
becoming less and less a game of strategy, and more and more an exhibition of a single
skill. In other words, the game is becoming less and less like chess, more and more like
"Home Run Derby." And this is my one and only complaint about the rash of home
runs being hit today.
In today's game - especially in the American League - you don't see much sacrifice
bunting, base stealing or station-to-station baseball anymore. Why risk an out when you
can drive in two or three runs with one swing of the bat? There is very little need in the
game today for players who are skilled at the "little things" in baseball like
bunting, running, hitting the other way to advance the runner and even fielding.
Increasingly, managers are willing to risk having a bad glove on the field as long as he
can hit. No need to worry about advancing runners over or sprinting from first to third on
a base hit. No need to cut down on your swing in order to get that runner on first into
scoring position. In short, no strategy is involved with being a big league manager today
other than filling out the lineup card and deciding when to yank the pitcher. It's the
Diamond Mind equivalent of hitting the "1" key over and over and over again. In
my mind, this type of baseball is boring as hell.
But is bunting, stealing and station-to-station baseball exciting for the novice baseball
fan? Not on your life. You can pluck an Aborigine female straight out of Central Australia
and show her a big guy clubbing a baseball 600 feet and she would find it exciting. No
need for in-depth comprehension of the game when you can be drubbed over the head with it.
I heard the other day - and I think it's true - that baseball is now the only major sport
around that features an abundance of offense. A team scoring 100 points in basketball has
become the exception rather than the rule. In hockey, you'll be lucky if you see a team
score more than two goals (a fact that has caused me endless aggravation, as every playoff
game in hockey is forced into overtime, causing "Baseball Tonight" to be pushed
back past my bed time.) And in football, owners are constantly looking for ways to boost
offense and handcuff defense. Is this the reason why baseball is suddenly gaining in
popularity? If you ask owners, they'd answer yes. But I believe baseball's popularity has
more to do with ESPN, new stadiums and our country's current economic prosperity (not
necessarily in that order.)
Baseball is more popular than ever right now, and owners and players are wealthier than
ever. King Bud and the Good Ol' Boys of Baseball believe (and rightfully so, I might add)
in the adage: "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." Therefore, they're not likely
to do anything to suppress this offensive explosion. I do wish, though, that something
would be done to restore the element of strategy in baseball. In order to fix a problem,
though, you have to find the source. Plenty of theories exist to explain this offensive
absurdity. You all know these theories by now, so I won't bore you by repeating them.
What would I do if I were Commissioner? Glad you asked.
First, I would figure out a way to dump the DH. Realistically, I know the Evil Don Fehr
and the Player's Association would never allow this to happen. But maybe expanding rosters
to 26 players would appease them enough to drop it in the best interests of the game.
Getting rid of the DH would do so many great things for the game, it's hard to find a
reason not to do it. For starters, it would balance the two leagues and eliminate the need
to create silly rules for interleague play and the post-season. It would reduce the amount
of offense and bring a little more balance to the game. It would create more strategy for
AL teams, and give AL managers something to do besides sit on their hands. Last and
probably least, it would help curb this recent rash of brushback pitches and on-field
brawling.
Second, I'd force the umpires to enforce the rulebook. It seems silly to have to force a
person to do the job he was hired to do, but apparently that's what it will take. If an
ump has problems calling a strike a strike - as defined by the rulebook - then it's back
to the bush leagues until he learns how to call them right. Maybe they could use that cool
new technology I see on Fox all the time - the "Pitch Tracker" with the 3-D
strike zone - to train these guys.
Another rule that needs to be enforced is this practice of batters that lean INTO pitches
in order to get a free pass to first. And while we're at it, I'll join Rob Neyer's crusade
and say that no more battle gear should be allowed at the plate. Between all the padding,
the cozy strike zone and the fear the pitchers have of pitching inside (lest they incur
the wrath of Frank Robinson), batters now are WAY too comfortable at the plate.
Aside from umpire-related issues, I believe the rules should also be enforced when it
comes to new ballparks. Enron Field and Pac Bell Park both clearly violate the Major
League rule stating that fences along the left and right field lines must be at least 325
feet from home plate. It is completely disgusting that Commissioner Bud allowed this to
happen, and the fact that he has looked the other way on this issue only proves that he is
a fraud and that a serious conflict of interests exists as long as he is in office. Why
have all these rules if they are just blatantly ignored?
And finally, I would make it illegal for players to take any "supplements" that
are deemed illegal by the Olympic Committee. Baseball has looked the other way on this
issue for a long time, and the press has pretty much ignored the issue as well. But it's
clear that a lot of players - a MAJORITY of players, even - are bulking up in unnatural
ways. Clearly, this presents an unfair advantage since pitchers gain nothing from added
strength.
I'm not asking for any rule changes whatsoever, and I don't believe that the game itself
should be altered in any way. The mound should be left exactly where it is, and the ball
should be made exactly the same (or the same as it was...or always has been.) If 20-19
games are a result of the natural evolution of the game of baseball then so be it. As
someone once pointed out recently, we don't make sprinters today wear lead shoes just
because they run twice as fast as sprinters in the '40's. Therefore, we shouldn't change
the game just to keep it the same. But I would like to see pitchers have a fighting chance
for survival, and I would like to see baseball's rules enforced instead of ignored.
Of course, the chances of King Bud and the Powers That Be doing something to tame this
offensive explosion are about the same as the New Milford Blazers stringing together a
four-game winning streak. As long as fans keep flocking to the parks and buying up all
those neon orange Yankee hats faster than they can make them, Bud and the boys will be
happy to keep things at status quo. And that might not be such a bad thing. After the
offensive explosions of the early 30's and 60's, everything eventually quieted down. I
wouldn't be too surprised if things are back to normal five years from now without any
help from anyone. Because...say it with me...baseball is cyclical.
Revenue Disparity
I've written about this issue before, and by now you're all sick and tired of hearing
about it. But I keep reading more and more opinions coming from only one side of the issue
(note: most baseball writers seem to come from Kansas City) that I feel some balance is
needed. Just to refresh your memory on where I stand on this issue, I believe that there
has always been great revenue disparity in baseball, and contrary to popular belief it is
not bad for the game, and it will not lead to the apocalypse. Just like offensive
explosions, John Travolta's career and bell-bottom pants, a baseball team's revenue is
cyclical. The great teams of today will be the cellar-dwellers of tomorrow. The rich today
will be poor tomorrow.
Eight years ago, Baltimore (#23), Cleveland (#26), Texas (#21) and Houston (#25) were
among the lowest in payroll and wins. Oakland (#2), Cincinnati (#8) and Pittsburgh (#6)
were among the biggest spenders and biggest winners. Soon enough, these teams will once
again switch places. There's no reason to hit the panic button just because Bud Selig's
and Bob Costas' favorite teams are currently in the middle of a lull, and the Evil George
Steinbrenner's team is currently enjoying a successful run.
What are the big issues occupying the time and thoughts of so many concerned baseball
enthusiasts these days? Let me tackle them one at a time:
1. "Teams with small payrolls simply can't compete." The
implication with this statement seems to be that teams with small payrolls SHOULD be
competitive. My question is: why should they? This Robin Hood-like attitude ("steal
from the rich, give to the poor") is frighteningly pervasive in a country that is
supposed to be a capitalist society. Success should come from hard work and talent, not
from undeserved charity designed to help "make everything even." Okay, enough
soapbox rambling. Let's look at some numbers.
1995-1999
| Payroll (% of top) |
# Teams |
# Playoff teams |
Pct. |
| 90-100% |
10 |
8 |
80% |
| 80-89% |
22 |
16 |
73% |
| 70-79% |
12 |
1 |
8% |
| 60-69% |
27 |
12 |
44% |
| 59% or below |
73 |
3 |
4% |
| Overall |
144 |
40 |
28% |
As you can see, the facts seem to back up the statement
that teams with small payrolls are unlikely to compete. Of the teams with payrolls below
60% of the highest payroll, only 3 of 73 (4%) have made the playoffs from 1995-1999.
Before we continue, let's increase the sample size a bit and include 1992 and 1993 (when
only four teams made the playoffs), 1994 (when there were no playoffs, but we'll count the
division leaders at the time of the strike as playoff teams) and the current season (where
the current division leaders will be considered playoff teams.)
1992-2000
| Payroll (% of top) |
# Teams |
# Playoff teams |
Pct. |
| 90-100% |
19 |
13 |
68% |
| 80-89% |
42 |
21 |
50% |
| 70-79% |
24 |
3 |
13% |
| 60-69% |
53 |
18 |
34% |
| 59% or below |
118 |
7 |
6% |
| Overall |
256 |
62 |
24% |
A little better, but once again, the teams spending less than 60% of the highest payroll
are scarcely represented (7 out of 118, 6%.) I wonder, however, if a team with a payroll
that low is genuinely interested in competing, or whether it is simply trying to make
enough money to sustain the franchise while the team rebuilds. If a team with a low
payroll really couldn't afford a high payroll, they'd likely be at the bottom of the pay
scale every year. A team doesn't suddenly become poor overnight if their success level
remains constant. Is payroll really as cyclical as I think it is? Instead of speculating,
let's take a look at the facts.
There are currently 14 teams in the major leagues with payrolls that are 59% or less of
the highest paid team. Of those 14 teams, all but one (Montreal) has had a payroll of 60%
or above in at least one season between 1992-1999 (note: unfortunately, I only have
revenue data dating back to 1992 or I'd look at the past ten years.)
Next question: were these teams able to compete recently? Of those 14 teams, eight have
appeared in the playoffs in at least one season between 1992-1999 - nine if you count the
Montreal Expos in 1994 when there were no playoffs, and ten if you count the Chicago White
Sox, who would be in the playoffs if the current season ended today. In other words, over
70-percent of today's "low-budget" teams have enjoyed recent success.
It seems to me that these teams aren't operating with a low payroll because they can't
afford it. Instead, it looks as if these teams are simply in the middle of a lull between
competitive seasons. They call those lulls "rebuilding years" and every team
goes through them, with the exception of two teams in recent history. I'll talk about
those teams a little later. As for the one exception to the rule, the Expos, they are what
is called in statistical terms "an outlier." The normal equation for being
competitive in baseball looks something like this: winning = increased attendance =
increased revenue = increased payroll = competitiveness. Generally, you can't have the
factor on the right without having the factor to the left. There are, however, exceptions.
For the Expos, this equation breaks down right at factor number two: increased attendance.
No matter how much the Expos win, their attendance remains ridiculously low. In 1996, when
the Expos challenged for the wild card down to the wire, they drew just 1.3 million fans -
18th in the league. This year, with Vladimir Guerrero and an exciting, young pitching
staff helping the team to the sixth-best record in the league, Montreal is drawing an
average of 13,207 per game. I don't have the numbers from 1994, when Montreal finished the
season with the best record in all of baseball, but I can't imagine they drew much more
than that 13,207 average. Compounding the problems in Montreal is the fact that they
failed to negotiate a television contract this year. But whose fault is that? George
Steinbrenner's?
Montreal simply is not a baseball town. Never was, never will be. Should the rest of the
league hold Montreal's hand and carry them into contention? I see no reason why they
should. I'd much rather see the team move somewhere where the fans will support them. But
it doesn't look like that will happen any time soon. Montreal has enough talent right now
to compete - and they are competing as I type. But as long as they are stuck at factor
number two in the success equation, they'll never enjoy a long run at the top.
The other outlier, I should note, is the New York Yankees. And the reason that they should
not be included in any rational argument on this issue is their enormous contract with the
MSG network. In 1996, the Yankees raked in $69.8 million in media revenue. 20 teams earned
between $20-$32 million and seven earned between $15-$20 million. Obviously, the Yankees
are the outlier. Their contract with MSG allows them to spend $38 million more than any
other team on payroll regardless of attendance. Because of this, the success equation
doesn't apply to them. But the MSG contract is a fluke, and is unlikely to be repeated
ever again.
The history of that MSG deal is actually pretty interesting. Steinbrenner just happened to
be in the very right place at the very right time. Before 1982, every baseball game
broadcast on television was aired on local, free TV. But in 1982, New York Mets owner
Nelson Doubleday signed a contract with an upstart cable TV service called SportsChannel.
SportsChannel was the brainchild of cable TV pioneer Chuck Dolan, who was the first person
to come up with the idea of bouncing a signal off the RCA broadcast satellite and creating
a pay cable service called HBO. Dolan wanted to secure the rights to all New York sports
games for his SportsChannel network, and he got the Islanders to sign on almost
immediately. At the time, the Mets were the top baseball team in the city, and Dolan
wanted to add the Mets to the fold in the worst way. So he offered Doubleday a THIRTY-YEAR
deal worth $17 million a year. Doubleday gladly accepted the record deal.
Right after that deal was made, cable TV took off in a big, big way, and the Mets' deal no
longer looked all that special. In 1983, Steinbrenner made a deal with SportsChannel for
$6.7 million a year. Unlike Doubleday, however, Steinbrenner was a little less myopic. He
signed a 15-year deal, but he smartly negotiated an escape clause after five years where
he could buy out the remainder of the deal for $16 million. By the time five years had
passed, in 1988, the cable market was at an all-time high, and Steinbrenner happily paid
the $16 million in exchange for a 12-year, $486 million deal with the upstart MSG network.
The rest, as they say, is history.
You simply can't compare the Yankees to the Expos, because they are both outliers. Any
time a discussion about revenue disparity arises, however, someone will undoubtedly
compare the two as their prime example why the game isn't fair, and why something must be
done to correct the injustice.
A new wrinkle has been added to the success equation in recent years, and it is the influx
of "mallparks" (as Rob Neyer likes to call them.) These new parks are more than
a venue for watching a ballgame. They are a combination of shopping mall, amusement park,
food festival and entertainment center. The game itself has almost become an afterthought
for some of these places, and at prices that are somewhat affordable in comparison with
other events, ballgames have become magnets for families and business people alike.
In addition to increased revenue generated from overall attendance, these parks also
feature tons of high-priced luxury suites and advertising income from gimmicks like the
giant Coke bottle in Pac Bell Park to the ubiquitous corporate naming of stadiums. For the
most part, these parks allow teams to dismiss the first part of the success equation,
which is winning. Whether the Orioles win or (more often) not, Camden Yards has always
been filled to capacity. This has allowed the ownership to keep the payroll high. Once
again, there is an exception to this new phenomenon, and it is Detroit's Comerica Park. I
don't quite understand why Detroit fans aren't coming out to this park like other fans at
other new parks. Maybe it has something to do with the fact that the team is awful and the
ticket prices are twice as high as they were last year. Or maybe the novelty of the new
"Camden-like" parks is finally starting to wear off.
2. "The disparity between the have's and have-not's is growing wider and
wider every year." Again, instead of squabbling over this, let's look at the
facts. Here are the revenue disparities between the highest and lowest payrolls for every
year from 1992-2000:
| Year |
Highest Team |
Payroll |
Lowest Team |
Payroll |
Low % of High |
| 1992 |
Toronto |
49,427,166 |
Cleveland |
9,323,339 |
19% |
| 1993 |
Toronto |
51,935,034 |
San Diego |
12,842,333 |
25% |
| 1994 |
Yankees |
47,512,342 |
San Diego |
13,774,268 |
29% |
| 1995 |
Yankees |
58,115,252 |
Mets |
13,097,944 |
23% |
| 1996 |
Yankees |
63,000,000 |
Milwaukee |
17,500,000 |
28% |
| 1997 |
Baltimore |
55,085,778 |
Pittsburgh |
9,071,667 |
16% |
| 1998 |
Yankees |
65,663,698 |
Florida |
15,141,000 |
21% |
| 1999 |
Yankees |
88,130,709 |
Florida |
15,150,000 |
17% |
| 2000 |
Yankees |
92,938,260 |
Minnesota |
16,654,500 |
18% |
This statement doesn't seem to hold water, does it? The disparity has pretty much been the
same since 1992 (and again, I'd love to go back even further, but I only have numbers for
the 1992-2000 seasons.) By the way, isn't it funny seeing teams like Cleveland and the
Mets listed as "have-nots?" The fact that a few of these teams appear on both
sides of the top-five payroll list over the past nine years only proves my earlier point
further.
What does all this mean? I think the sample size may be too small to draw any definitive
solutions, but there doesn't appear to be any sort of trend one way or the other. Since
1992, the gap between the "have's" and "have-not's" appears to be
relatively stable.
3. "The playoffs are comprised of nothing but the richest teams."
Proponents of this particular phrase often cite the 1999 playoffs as their prime example.
In 1999, all eight teams in the postseason were in the top ten in payroll. Of course, it's
not accurate to take one particular year and use that as the one and only proof for an
argument. In 1998, the Astros made the playoffs with a payroll ranking 13th. In 1997,
Seattle (#15), San Francisco (#19) and Houston (#21) all made the playoffs. In 1996, Los
Angeles (#12) and San Diego (#14) did it. If you take the 40 playoff teams from 1995-1999,
here is the breakdown by payroll as a percentage of the top payroll:
| % of Top Payroll |
# of Teams (out of 40) |
Pct. |
| 90-100% |
8 |
20% |
| 80-89% |
16 |
40% |
| 70-79% |
1 |
2.5% |
| 60-69% |
12 |
30% |
| 50-59% |
3 |
7.5% |
37.5% of playoff teams during that time were represented by teams with payrolls of less
than 70% of the top team's payroll. If you add in the 1994-2000 seasons, the percentage
looks even better:
| % of Top Payroll |
# of Teams (out of 62) |
Pct. |
| 90-100% |
13 |
21% |
| 80-89% |
21 |
34% |
| 70-79% |
3 |
5% |
| 60-69% |
18 |
29% |
| 50-59% |
7 |
11% |
That's 45% - or nearly half - of all playoff teams represented by teams with less than 70%
of the top team's payroll. Clearly, the playoffs aren't populated solely by the wealthy
elite every year. If you want to argue that 1999 is the most recent year, therefore it is
the most significant, than I'll show you the percentages for this season's leaders: 100%,
89%, 87%, 84%, 69%, 64%, 36% and 34%.
Now, I know what you're thinking. The first factor in my success equation is winning. But
how can a team win without having a large payroll? Good question. I'm glad you asked.
Let's look at two successful teams in baseball and figure out how they became successful:
1. The New York Yankees. I've already talked about how this team is
really the exception rather than the rule because of their unusual amount of media
revenue. But the MSG contract began in 1989, and the Yankees were awful until around 1994.
How did they become successful? Contrary to popular belief, it wasn't free agency. It was
their farm system. Derek Jeter, Andy Pettitte, Bernie Williams, Jorge Posada and Mariano
Rivera to be specific. They also used farm products Eric Milton, Russ Davis, Sterling
Hitchcock, Marty Janzen and Ruben Rivera to get Chuck Knoblauch, Tino Martinez, David Cone
and Roger Clemens. Orlando Hernandez was also, technically, a product of the farm. For all
the talk about how the Yankees have "bought their way into the playoffs" the
past five years, none of the regular, contributing players in the starting lineup,
pitching rotation or bullpen were acquired as free agents.
2. The Atlanta Braves. Unlike the Yankees, the Braves don't have an
enormous media contract. But that's only because their owner happens to own all of their
broadcast rights (as well as the broadcast rights to most of the free world.) Ted Turner
pays only a tiny sum (to himself, basically) for the rights to air Braves games on TBS.
But he receives untold millions in revenue from the exposure TBS receives from airing
Braves games to much of the country, and he writes off as much as he can as
"losses" every tax day. It's a sweet deal, but what do you expect when you deal
in the world of conflicted interests? Like the Yankees, though, the Braves have achieved
success through their farm. Chipper Jones, Andruw Jones, Javy Lopez, Rafael Furcal, Tom
Glavine, John Smoltz (who was not drafted by the Braves, but developed through their farm
system) and John Rocker (to name just a few) were all drafted and developed through the
Braves' farm. Other farm products such as Ryan Klesko, Mike Kelly, David Justice and Tommy
Green were traded in exchange for players like Reggie Sanders, Quilvio Veras and Kenny
Lofton.
I could continue with every other successful team in baseball history, but you get the
picture. Basically, success starts with the farm. And this is nothing new. The Twins of
'87-'91 became successful because of farm products like Frank Viola, Gary Gaetti, Kirby
Puckett, Kent Hrbek and Scott Erickson. The stars of the '86-'90 Oakland A's dynasty were
farm products: Jose Canseco, Mark McGwire and Walt Weiss. The Dodgers have built several
great teams thanks to stars of the farm like Raul Mondesi, Eric Karros, Steve Sax, Mike
Piazza, Orel Hershiser, Fernando Valenzuela and others. When the Kansas City Royals ruled
the AL West in the late '70's and '80's, who were their stars? George Brett, Hal McRae,
Larry Gura, Willie Wilson, Frank White, John Wathan, Paul Splittorff, Mark Gubicza, Bret
Saberhagen and Dan Quisenberry - all products of the farm.
If baseball success begins with the farm, which teams are most likely to succeed in the
future? How about Minnesota with David Ortiz, Matt LeCroy, Corey Koskie, Matt Lawton, Brad
Radke, Eric Milton, Mike Restovich, Mike Cuddyer and B.J. Garbe? How about Kansas City
with Dee Brown, Mark Quinn, Johnny Damon, Carlos Beltran, Carlos Febles, Mike Sweeney,
Jose Rosado, Jeff Austin, Dan Reichert, Chad Durbin and Junior Guerrero? How about
Montreal with Ugueth Urbina, Michael Barrett, Vlad Guerrero, Rondell White, Peter
Bergeron, Milton Bradley, Jose Vidro, Javier Vazquez, Dustin Hermanson, Carl Pavano and
Tony Armas? Or what about Oakland, with Ben Grieve, Eric Chavez, Adam Piatt, Jason and
Jeremy Giambi, Ramon Hernandez, Miguel Tejada, Tim Hudson, Mark Mulder and Barry Zito?
Each one of these teams - Minnesota, Kansas City, Montreal and Oakland - is currently
being used as an example of a team that can never compete because they don't have the
payroll. But once these teams start winning - and I think it has happened already - the
fans will (or should) begin to fill their stadiums. And once they fill their stadiums,
their revenues will increase. And once their revenues increase, their payrolls will
increase as well. It's only a matter of time.
Now that I've laid it all out on the line, dispelled all the myths and untruths, and
uncovered the facts behind the hysteria, my biggest question is this: why am I, a no-name
nobody with no connection to the game whatsoever, the only person I've ever heard who has
come down on this side of the issue? The answer is simple: controversy sells. It sells
newspapers, it sells magazines and it sells air time on television and radio. No one wants
to hear someone stand up and declare that everything is just fine. That's why the nightly
news is filled with death and tragedy every night. That's why the leading story on the
front page of the papers is not the latest medical breakthrough in cancer treatments or
the discovery of extrasolar planets; it's the latest controversy surrounding the flawed
celebrity or politician de jour, the latest high-profile death or murder, or the latest
crisis facing our economy, the environment or our nation's children. Bad news sells; good
news doesn't.
So what have we learned from all of this? Let's summarize:
a) The only problem with the increase in offense in baseball is the decrease in strategy.
b) If you're worried about your favorite small-market team being able to compete in the
near future, just be patient.
c) Don't believe everything you read.
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